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A GOOD STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: ILLINOIS
ELIMINATES THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ATTORNEYS AND
GUARDIANS
Alberto Bernabe*
INTRODUCTION

Last year, the Illinois Supreme Court decided what could one day
become one of the most important cases on juvenile delinquency practice.'
This is so because it correctly addressed one of the most prevalent
problems in most, if not all, juvenile delinquency systems throughout the
nation: the conflict between the roles of attorneys and guardians ad litem.
In the Illinois case, the court invalidated the widespread practice of
allowing an attorney to serve in both roles at the same time, whether
explicitly or impliedly. The court held that representing a minor as an
attorney and as a guardian at the same time, or attempting to serve the best
interests of the minor to the detriment of the duties of an attorney,
constitutes an inherent conflict of interest and creates too much of a risk of
a violation of a minor's Constitutional right to counsel.2 In doing so, the
court clarified the duties of lawyers who represent juveniles.
The court's holding is extremely significant because the type of
conflicted, and flawed, representation involved in the case is common in
most, if not all, jurisdictions in the United States today. It is a problem that
needs to be addressed, and the Illinois Supreme Court's decision is a good
first step in the right direction. However, it is important to spread the word
about the problem and the relatively simple solution for there to be real
progress in solving it. Hoping it will help in that process, this essay will
describe the problem and highlight that possible solution.

. Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; B.A., Princeton University; J.D., University of
Puerto Rico Law School; LL.M., Temple University School of Law.
1.
People v. Austin M., 975 N.E.2d 22 (1ll. 2012).
2.
Austin M., 975 N.E.2d at 42.
3.
For a longer discussion of the issue in the context of Illinois law and practice before the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in People v. Austin M., see Alberto Bemabe, The Right to Counsel Denied:
Confusing the Roles of Lawyers and Guardians, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 833 (2012).
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I
Starting at the very end of the 1 9th century, different states in the
United States began to establish a separate system of justice to deal with
delinquent minors-meaning minors who engaged in conduct that would
be considered a crime if committed by an adult.4 The move to create a new
judicial system designed specifically for this purpose was the result of
efforts by a group of reformers who believed that children should not be
subjected to the harshness of the criminal justice system. They thought that
juvenile proceedings should provide "rehabilitation" rather than
punishment.
For this reason, procedures in the newly created juvenile justice
systems around the country were designed to be more informal than those
of criminal trials. Two of the defining characteristics of this informality
were the fact that children were rarely represented by attorneys and that
their rights were thought to be better served by allowing adults to decide
what was in the minors' best interests. 6 This view is exemplified by an
article written in 1909 by a prominent proponent of the original reform
movement, which stated the theory behind the new approach to juvenile
justice as follows:
The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in
[juvenile delinquency] hearings.... Seated at a desk, with the child
at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his
shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of
his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his
work.7
The juvenile justice system, however, has changed dramatically over
the years. Juvenile delinquency proceedings have, in fact, become much

4.
Chicago became the site of the first separate juvenile court in the United States in 1899.
Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1191-92
(1970) (discussing the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, § 1,111.Laws 131-32 (repealed 1965)).
5.
Marvin Ventrell, The PracticeofLaw for Children, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 75, 85-87
(2006).
6.
Tamar R. Birckhead, Culture Clash: The Challenge of Lawyering Across Difference in
Juvenile Court, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 959, 970-71 (2010).
7.
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 120 (1909).
8.

SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 458 (4th ed. 2010)

("Public pressure has led state legislatures to embrace a more punitive model that resembles the adult
criminal process . . . ."); see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1971) ("[T]he fond
and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three generations ago have
not been realized."); Katherine R. Kruse, Standing in Babylon, Looking Toward Zion, 6 NEV. L.J. 1315,
1318 (2006) ("[R]ight to adversary counsel in delinquency cases was established in a surge of realism
about the widespread failure ofjuvenile courts to live up to their rehabilitative ideals.").
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more like criminal proceedings.9 For this reason, beginning with a series of
decisions starting in the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court began to
recognize that minors in delinquency proceedings must be assured due
process guarantees comparable to those provided to adult criminal
defendants.io
Indeed, as a reaction to the then prevailing informality of delinquency
proceedings, where assistance of counsel was thought to be an obstacle to
the process, the Supreme Court implied that juvenile delinquency
proceedings resembled "kangaroo courts" and held that the Constitution
guarantees minors the right to counsel." In fact, the Court asserted that
"no . . . action holds more potential for achieving procedural justice for the
child in the juvenile court than provision of counsel."' 2
Unfortunately, however, recognizing that children have a constitutional
right to counsel has not necessarily resulted in a systematic protection of
that right. The extent to which states guarantee the right to counsel in
delinquency proceedings varies among jurisdictions. 3 Also, access to
adequate representation is affected by other problems common to juvenile
justice systems throughout the United States, including the continuing
confusion over the role of counsel in delinquency proceedings.14

9.
For specific examples that illustrate this trend, see Bemabe, supra note 3, at 840-49.
10.
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 519-20 (1975); Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707, 708 (1979); ROBYN WALKER STERLING, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ROLE OF
JUVENILE DEFENSE
COUNSEL
IN DELINQUENCY
COURT
1 (2009),
available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/role-ofjuvenile defense counsel.pdf.
I1.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 28-30.
12.
Id. at 38 n.65.
13.
RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 8, at 515 (quoting N. Lee Cooper, Conveyor Belt Justice, 83
ABA J. 6 (1997)) ("[Tlhousands of juveniles are urged or cajoled into waiving their rights without
adequate representation . . . ."); see also, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221(A) (2011) (counsel appointed
only if offense can result in detention); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (West 2011) (requiring the
appointment of counsel in a delinquency hearing within five days of the filing of the petition or before
the commencement of the detention hearing); DEL. FAM. CT. R. CRIM. P., 44(a) (2012) (stating that a
minor can waive right to counsel); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:12 (LexisNexis 2010) (stating that
the court shall appoint counsel at the time of arraignment for a minor, provided that the minor does not
have a valid waiver); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39 (West 2011) (describing that a juvenile shall have
the right to counsel); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(1) (2006) (stating that a minor has a right to be
present, heard, and present evidence, as well as the right to be represented by counsel); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §419C.200 (2011) (mandating that the court must appoint counsel to a child in any case in which
the court would be required to appoint counsel to an adult charged with the same offense); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(2) (West 2004) (stating that children have the right to be represented by
counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings).
14.
A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION INDELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 26 (1995), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf [hereinafter A CALL FOR JUSTICE] ("[D]esire to 'help' children ...
reflects profound confusion about the lawyer's ethical duty to juvenile clients. Although ethical and
legal standards call for attorneys to represent children as zealously as they would adults . . . sometimes.
. . children's attorneys . . .abandon adversarial efforts in paternalistic deference to the court's efforts to
intervene in the child's life."). The problem is prevalent throughout the United States. See ELIZABETH
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M. CALVIN, A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., WASHINGTON: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE OFFENDER MATTERS 3 (2003), availableat

http://www.njdc.info/pdf/wareport.pdf ("There is confusion and disagreement about the role of juvenile
defenders [in Washington] and, as a result, important opportunities to effectively counsel and represent
the interests of the child are lost."); TEX. APPLESEED FAIR DEF. PROJECT ON INDIGENT DEF. PRACTICES
IN TEX., SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 24 (2000), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/TexasAssess.pdf (quoting a defense counsel as saying: "[My first task is] to
get these kids help. If they don't
than their parents do."); A.B.A.
MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT
DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS

agree with me, I don't care. I know what is in their best interest better
JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATLANTIC JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR.,
OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
32 (Elizabeth Cumming et al. eds., 2003), available at

http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mdreport.pdf ("Many public defenders did not appear to understand the
critical role of defense counsel in providing zealous advocacy through an express interest model of
representation."); ELIZABETH GLADDEN KEHOE & KIM BROOKS TANDY, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER
CTR. & CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., INDIANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 40 (2006), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdflIndiana%20Assessment.pdf (finding that one of the systemic barriers to
effective representation in delinquency proceedings in the state is the misperception about the role of
counsel as a guardian rather than as an advocate); A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & SO. JUVENILE
DEFENDER CTR., NORTH CAROLINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 39 (Lynn Grindall et al. eds., 2003), available at

http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ncreport.pdf ("As a result of this confusion about counsel's role, many
juveniles [do] not appear to be clear about who was representing them .... ); PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL.,
NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MISSISSIPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN YOUTH COURT PROCEEDINGS 42 (2007), available at

http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mississippi_ assessment.pdf ("Many juvenile defenders believe . . . that their
role is to protect the 'best interests' of the child, not to assume an adversarial role in which they-protect
the legal interests of their clients."); A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., KENTUCKY: ADVANCING
JUSTICE: AN

DELINQUENCY

ASSESSMENT

OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL

PROCEEDINGS

33

(Patricia

Puritz

AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION

IN

available

at

et

al.

eds.,

2002),

(noting significant discrepancies regarding
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/KentuckyAssessment.pdf
representation in delinquency proceedings, particularly the fact that "in some counties assigned counsel
were actually . . . 'guardian[s] ad litem' . . . assigned from the court's roster of attorneys used in
dependency, neglect and abuse cases"); A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & NEW ENGLAND JUVENILE
DEFENDER CTR., MAINE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 28 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mereport.pdf
(identifying as a concern "the systemic pressure for juvenile defenders to act in the 'best interest of the
child,' sometimes in opposition to their role as zealous advocates," that various judges interviewed
affirmed "that juvenile defenders' first duty is to consider the best interests of the child" rather than

acting as zealous advocates, and that "zealous advocacy on legal grounds is not favored"); A.B.A.
JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., MONTANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 40 (Brock Albin et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.njdc.info/ pdf/mtreport.pdf (identifying confusion among participants in the juvenile court
system over whether the role of public defenders is to protect the "best interests" of the child and
reported that judges seem to want "public defenders to be advocates for the system . . . rather that
advocates for their. . . clients"); JESSIE BECK, PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT'L
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., JUVENILE LEGAL DEFENSE: A REPORT ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN IN NEBRASKA 54 (2009), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ nebraska assessment.pdf ("[D]efense attorneys across the state showed that
they erroneously thought that their role was to act in the client's best interest."); A.B.A. JUVENILE
JUSTICE CTR. & CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS
TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO 26 (Kim

Brooks et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Ohio Assessment.pdf ("[O1ne of the
most disturbing trends noted by investigators and in survey data was the lack of clarity regarding the
attorney's role in juvenile delinquency proceedings."); MARY ANN SCALI, JI SEON SONG & PATRICIA
PURITZ, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., SOUTH CAROLINA JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE: A REPORT
ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 21-22,
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This confusion is a serious problem because it is based on a flawed
approach that, while supposedly designed to protect the rights of juveniles,
actually results in a violation of the rights of the minors with tremendously
negative consequences for the system, the profession, and, of course, the
minors themselves.
II
Even though most organizations that set advocacy standards for
juvenile defenders have emphasized that the duty of the lawyer for a
juvenile is to advocate for the legal rights of the minor and not to support
some other person's determination of the juvenile's best interests,' 5 there is
significant evidence that confusion exists among attorneys and judges who
participate in juvenile delinquency proceedings as to the proper role of
attorneys who represent minors.'6 In some states, courts allow,17 expect, or
even encourage attorneys to act as attorneys and as guardians ad litem

51 (2010), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/south carolina assessment.pdf (noting that juvenile
defenders and other court personnel across the state are unclear or have not accepted the proper role of
the attorney in delinquency proceedings; ethical and role confusion leaves far too many children
defenseless); see also A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra, at 26 (stating that "many of those who represent
children do not understand their ethical obligations, and as a result, fail to zealously represent their
young clients"); NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ENCOURAGING JUDGES TO SUPPORT ZEALOUS
DEFENSE ADVOCACY FROM DETENTION

TO POST-DISPOSITION:

AN OVERVIEW

OF THE JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES 3

(2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/NCJFCJFact Sheet Reprint Fall_2012.pdf ("Many
juvenile justice practitioners mistakenly believe that juvenile defenders are obliged to argue for a
child's 'best interests' in court."); Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing
Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6 NEV. L.J. 592, 592
(2006) ("[O]ften well-meaning professionals and systems sometimes substitute their own interests or
ideas about what children need for the wisdom of the children and their families, and provide solutions
that are neither welcome nor responsive to the need."); Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding
Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 771, 799-800 (2010) (identifying "persistence of best-interest representation" as one of the factors
that contributes to inadequate representation unique to juvenile court); Kristin Henning, Loyalty,
Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child's Counsel in Delinquency
Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 266-67 (2005) (pointing out that "[i]n Ohio ... judges routinely
appoint advocates to serve in delinquency cases as 'attorney/guardian ad litem,' notwithstanding
statutes that require appointment of 'counsel' in those proceedings . . . " and that "in Vermont [a] statute
... [allows] the appointment of either a guardian ad litem or counsel," and that the statutes in several
other states "confuse the role of counsel"); Diane Somberg, Defining the Role of Law Guardian in New
York State by Statute, Standards and Case Law, 19 ToURo L. REV. 529, 529 (2003) ("Confusion is
generated by the fact that New York attempts to combine several traditional roles into one entitled 'law
guardian."').
I5.
See infra note 56; Birckhead, supranote 6, at 967.
16.
See supra note 14; Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Court-A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN 371, 409 (2008).
17.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-116(2) (2009) ("[T]he legal representative of the child is
not required to adopt the child's wishes in his or her recommendation or advocacy for the child . . . .").
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simultaneously' 8 and, as a result, many attorneys end up acting contrary to
their ethical duties or providing ineffective assistance of counsel.
In particular, many judges and attorneys believe that the role of the
attorney representing a juvenile is unique and fundamentally different than
that of a criminal defense attorney in that it requires the attorney to protect
a child client's legal rights and best interests simultaneously. The problem
is that, contrary to the claim that it is designed to protect the interests of
minors, this approach to legal representation in juvenile delinquency
proceedings actually operates to defeat those interests, because it eliminates
the effectiveness of the attorney's role as an attorney, destroys the
necessary trust upon which the attorney-client relationship must be based,
jeopardizes the confidentiality of the information provided to the attorney,
and essentially leaves the minor without legal representation.
This continuing confusion is the result of a profound misunderstanding
of the function of attorneys in delinquency proceedings. An attorney who
is also a guardian will have to choose either to advance the desired
objectives of the client-as required by the duties prescribed in the rules of
professional conduct-or to violate those duties in order to advocate for
what the attorney believes to be the best interest of the minor. If the
attorney chooses the first option, the attorney disregards the duty as a
guardian. If the attorney chooses the second option, the attorney violates
the professional duties as a lawyer. 9 This inherent conflict of interests, in
turn, leaves the minor client, who may be facing lifelong negative
consequences, legally vulnerable.
III
The most basic principle of the attorney-client relationship is that
attorneys owe fiduciary duties to their clients. Attorneys also have an
obligation to respect the client's autonomy to make decisions, at a

The applicable statute in Michigan actually mandates that the attorney act as a guardian ad
18.
litem rather than as an attorney. MICH. COMP. LAWS §712A.17d(l)(d)(i) (2009) ("The lawyer-guardian
ad litem's powers and duties include . . . mak[ing] a determination regarding the child's best interests
and advocat[ing] for those best interests according to the lawyer-guardian['s] . . . understanding of
those best interests, regardless of whether the lawyer-guardian['s] . . . determination reflects the child's
wishes.").
19.
Christopher N. Wu, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Children in Dependency
Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1857, 1871 (1996) (questioning whether attorney who conceives of her
role as representing her view of the child's best interests is engaged in "the practice of law at all").
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minimum as to the objectives of the representation,20 and to pursue the
client's objectives with diligence.2'
According to generally accepted notions of professional responsibility,
if an attorney disagrees with a client's position or believes that pursuing the
client's stated objective is not in the client's best interest, the lawyer can
advise the client accordingly, explaining the disadvantages and dangers of
the client's choice.22 Unless the attorney is willing to withdraw from the
representation,23 the attorney should ultimately follow the client's
instructions rather than substitute judgment for that of the client.24
A second element of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client, which is
also clearly expressed in generally accepted rules of professional conduct,
is the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, which means to avoid situations
where the attorney faces a substantial risk that the attorney's duty to a
client might be compromised.25 Based on this principle, a lawyer has a
duty to make sure that neither the lawyer's own interests nor those of others
"impede or compromise fulfillment of the lawyer's duties to the client." 2 6
The reason for this approach to conflicts of interest is simple.
Allowing lawyers to operate under circumstances where there is a
substantial risk that they would be tempted to violate their duties to their
clients would damage the trust and confidence upon which the attorneyclient relationship must be based.
Although establishing an attorney-client relationship with a minor may
raise some concerns particular to the fact that the client is in fact a minor,
the general principles reflected in the rules of professional conduct do not
change much in those cases. 27 Thus, in most circumstances, rules of
professional conduct demand that attorneys for minors abide by the same
20.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012); RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN
DzIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A STUDENT'S GUIDE §1.2-2(a), at 104-105 (2010)

("The lawyer is the agent (not the guardian) of the client .... The lawyer must abide by the client's
decisions concerning the objectives of [the] representation.") (internal quotation omitted).
21.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RS. 1.1-1.3 (2012) (addressing competence, allocation
of authority to make decisions, and diligence); see also STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF THE LFGAL
PROFESSION 68-69 (2009).
22.
23.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RS. 1.2 & 2.1 (2002).
If the lawyer finds the situation intolerable, the lawyer may try to withdraw from

representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2002).
24.
See, e.g., State v. Joanna V., 94 P.3d. 783, 786-87 (N.M. 2004) ("Although counsel may advise
the client on counsel's view of the client's best interests, counsel is ultimately required to advance the
client's expressed wishes."); see also Annette Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy
of the Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1959-60 (1996)
("[L]awyers may not normally substitute their own opinions regarding the goals of [the] representation .
25.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
26.
GILLERS, supra note 21, at 18.
27.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2002); see also Henning, supra note 14, at 280
("[C]urrent impediments to a normal attomey-child relationship may not be so insurmountable as to
require or justify a model of advocacy that differs so radically from the representation of adults.").
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duties owed to an adult client.28 Even in those rare circumstances where
attorneys are allowed to use their own judgment to protect the interests of a
minor client, it is clear that the lawyer's conduct should be guided more by
respect toward the client's autonomy than by what the lawyer may think is
better for the client.2 9 This is why in cases where the lawyer is in doubt as
to the best way to proceed, the suggested course of action is not to make
decisions for the client, but to ask for the appointment of a guardian other
than the lawyer. 30 Simply stated, the generally accepted approach is that
attorneys should not substitute their own judgment for that of the minor.
In contrast to the attorney's role, the role of the guardian ad litem is to
use the guardian's judgment to determine the best interests of the child and
to pibvide that information to the court in order to help the judge make
decisions affecting the disposition of the child. The lawyer owes duties to
the client; the guardian owes them to the court.
Given these different roles, representing a minor client while
concurrently serving as guardian ad litem for the child threatens the validity
of the representation by disregarding the basic foundations of the attorneyclient relationship.
Making matters worse, confusion over the role of an attorney for a
minor can affect the duty of confidentiality owed to the minor. An attorney
for a minor, just like an attorney with any other type of client, is bound by
the duty of confidentiality.31 In contrast, a guardian must be available to
testify at the request of the court about the guardian's conclusions
regarding the best interests of the child. For this reason, an attorney who
concurrently represents and serves as a guardian for a child has
incompatible duties: to keep the child's information confidential and to
disclose it.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2002).
28.
29.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2002). On this point, the comment to Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.14 states that "[i]n taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided
by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and
the goals of intruding into the client's decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible,
maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections." MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2002).
30.
31.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012). The issues related to the competing duties
regarding confidentiality as they relate to the confusion of roles of attorneys and guardians is examined
by Bruce Boyer in Report ofthe Working Group on Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1374
(1996); see also STERLING, supra note 10, at 12 ("[J]uvenile defense counsel has an affirmative
obligation to safeguard a client's information . . . from parents or guardians . . ." and "parents or
guardians do not have any right to inspect a juvenile defense counsel's file, notes, discovery, or any
other case-related documents without the client's . . . consent . . . . Even if revealing the information

might allow the client to receive sorely-needed services, defense counsel is bound to protect the client's
confidences, unless the client gives the attorney express permission to reveal the information to get the
particular services, or disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the client's case objectives.").

2013]

A Good Step in the Right Direction

169

Again, under those circumstances, the attorney would have to decide
whether to disclose confidential information against the client's wishes, in
which case the attorney would violate the duty of confidentiality,32 or not to
disclose the information, in which case the attorney would violate the duty
to the court as a guardian.
Moreover, minors who understand the possibility that the attorney may
have to disclose the information may not feel free to share information with
their attorneys, which can negatively affect their representation. This is
contrary to the public policy that supports recognizing the duty of
confidentiality in the first place.33
IV
Surprisingly, however, by all accounts, this type of conflicted
representation is allowed all over the United States. In each and every one
of those instances, it can be argued that the minor client has been, or is
being, deprived of the constitutional right to counsel.34 From any
perspective, the role-confusion generated by the prevailing practice ends up
hurting rather than helping the minors whose rights courts are supposed to
be protecting.
One case will suffice to illustrate the problem. In In re K.MB.,36 for
example, a thirteen year old asked her court-appointed attorney to argue in
favor of allowing her to remain at home. Instead, the attorney, in agreeing
with the State's position, argued exactly the opposite-that the minor
should be removed from the home. On appeal, the minor argued the
attorney's conduct violated her constitutional right to counsel, but the court
held that a court-appointed juvenile counsel is obligated to protect a child

32.
Hollister v. Hollister, 496 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Wis. 1992) (explaining that a guardian appointed
under statute in a custody matter functions as lawyer and therefore could not be called as a witness or
cross-examined in a custody proceeding); Michigan Informal Ethics Op. RI-318 (2000) (noting that a
lawyer-guardian for a minor in a protective proceeding is bound by rules of professional conduct and,
therefore, must not reveal child's confidences).
33.
See Emily Buss, "You're my What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers'Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1713-16 (1996).
34.
This was one of the conclusions of the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children. See Report of the Working Group on Conflicts of Interest, 64 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1379, 1387 (1996). This problem is also specifically mentioned in an assessment report of
juvenile justice system in South Carolina when it says that "[tlhe ethical and role confusion that often
characterizes juvenile court practice leaves far too many children literally defenseless."; see also MARY
ANN SCALI & JI SEON SONG WITH PATRICIA PURITZ, SOUTH CAROLINA JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE:
A REPORT ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY

PROCEEDINGS 21, 51 (2010), availableat http://www.njdc.info/pdf/south carolina assessment.pdf.
35.
Henning, supra note 14, at 285 ("[A] model of advocacy that denies the child a meaningful
voice in the attomey-client relationship, and thus in the juvenile justice system as a whole, may actually
hinder the rehabilitative and public safety objectives of the court.").
36.
In re K.M.B., 462 N.E.2d 1271 (lll. App. Ct. 1984).
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client's legal rights and best interests simultaneously.3 1 What is shocking
about this result is that in this particular case, the court's ruling would have
required the attorney to advocate that the court should allow the child to
remain at home while arguing at the same time that it would be better if the
court did not allow her to stay at home.
Attempting to explain this contradiction, the court then firmly
concluded that "[i]f protecting a juvenile's best interest requires that the
counsel make a recommendation contrary to the juvenile's wishes, then the
counsel has . . . a 'professional responsibility and obligation' to make that

recommendation."3 This would be a fine way to solve the problem were it
not for the fact that it amounts to asserting that the attorney has a
professional obligation to violate the attorney's duties of professional
responsibility.
In this case, as in so many others like it, the attorney for the minor
simply abandoned the representation of the client. Thus, even though the
minor supposedly had an attorney providing legal representation, in reality
all she had was a guardian who was not performing the duties of an
attorney. Therefore, under these circumstances, the minor was forced to
face the proceedings without legal representation-a violation of her
constitutional rights-and the court not only allowed it to happen, but took
the position that it was better that way.
V
When it comes to delinquency proceedings, the view expressed by
courts that have allowed-or worse, encouraged-attorneys to serve as
attorneys and guardians at the same time is based on two basic ideas: that
juvenile delinquency proceedings are (1) still significantly different from
criminal trials, and (2) designed to have a panel of people, including the
juvenile's lawyer, put their arms around the minor's shoulder and work
together to determine the child's best interests in order to plan the minor's
future. 39 That is a description of the original juvenile justice system-a
system in which legal representation was thought to be an obstacle, rather
37.
Id. at 1272-73.
38.
Id. at 1273.
39.
See, e.g., In re Beasley, 362 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ill. 1977), in which the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that although a juvenile delinquency proceeding "retains certain adversary characteristics, it is
not in the usual sense an adversary proceeding, but it is one to be administered in a spirit of humane
concern for and to promote the welfare of the minor as well as to serve the best interests of the
community." Also, a report on the juvenile justice system in Mississippi quotes a juvenile defense
attorney as saying, "I don't always listen to what [the clients] say .... Mine is not the role of the typical
defense attorney; I must consider what is best for the child, and I do not take the position that I must
'get the child off at all costs."' PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER, MISSISSIPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN YOUTH COURT PROCEEDINGS 42 (2007),

available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mississippi-assessment.pdf.
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than a benefit, to the process. That may be a nice system, but it is most
certainly not the current system.4 0 In fact, that is a description of the type
of system that was found to deny minors their right to due process.
Fortunately, with its decision in People v. Austin M.,4 1 the Illinois
Supreme Court has finally broken away from the national trend and has set
a good example for other jurisdictions to follow. In this case, a lawyer was
hired to represent two minors in a delinquency proceeding. The attorney
was hired to appear as the minors' lawyer, and at a pre-trial hearing, the
trial court underscored this by informing the boys' parents that the
appointed counsel represented the minors and not the parents.42 However,
the judge then stated that the attorney "represents what's in the best
interest" of the boys.43 To make matters worse, notwithstanding the fact
that the lawyer was hired to appear as the attorney for the minors and that
he told the judge during the pre-trial conference that he would do so, the
attorney apparently understood his role to be that of a guardian instead. He
understood his role to be the same as that of the prosecutors, aligning
himself with the prosecution and the judge in what was referred to as "a
common search for the truth."44
After the minors were convicted, one of them appealed, arguing among
other things, that he had been denied his right to counsel.4 5 The court of
appeals agreed that even though the attorney had not been officially
appointed as a guardian, it was clear he thought his role was to act like one
and, in fact, did act like one, thus creating a problematic issue of role
confusion.46 The court, therefore, treated the issues raised by the minor as
if the trial court had formally appointed the attorney as guardian ad litem.47
However, the court did not find that the minor's rights had been violated
and affirmed the lower court's decision, basing its conclusion on the
common rhetoric that "the responsibility of the court-appointed juvenile
counsel varies from that of other court-appointed counsel because juvenile
proceedings

. . . are not

as adversarial

as

traditional,

criminal

40.
For a more detailed description of the development of juvenile justice system in Illinois, see
Bemabe, supra note 3, at 840-49.
41.
See People v. Austin M., 975 N.E.2d 22 (lll. 2012).
42.
Id. at 25.
43.
Id.
44.
Id. at 26.
45.
As explained later in the Supreme Court's opinion, "Austin's initial claim on appeal is that the
legal representation he received at his delinquency trial amounted to a denial of his right to counsel ....
More specifically, Austin contends that, as a minor tried for a criminal offense in a delinquency
proceeding, he had the right to a defense attorney, that is, an attorney who gives his client his undivided
loyalty, who zealously safeguards his client's rights and confidences, and who acts in accordance with
his client's wishes. Austin asserts that he was deprived of this type of counsel because his attorney ...
performed less as a defense attorney and more as a guardian ad litem (GAL)." Id. at 36.
46.
In re Austin M., 941 N.E.2d 903, 912, 916 (lll. App. Ct. 2010).
47.
Id. at 916.

172

The Journal of the Legal Profession

[Vol. 38:161

proceedings." 4 8 The court cited the terms of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act
to support the position that "appointment of separate counsel is
unnecessary when the trial court has already appointed a guardian ad litem
who is also a licensed attorney,"49 which simply misses the point of the
argument.
Fortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court understood the point of the
argument.50 It is precisely because a guardian and an attorney do not have
the same obligations that the roles are in conflict. For this reason, the court
correctly found that combining the roles of attorney and guardian creates
too much of a risk that the minor's constitutional "right to counsel will be
diluted, if not denied altogether."5 1 Courts simply cannot say that
appointing an attorney to serve as a guardian at litem would satisfy the right
to counsel.
Further, the court was emphatic that because "a juvenile's right to
counsel in a delinquency proceeding is firmly anchored in . . . due

,,52
i
process,
a "minor in a delinquency proceeding has a nonwaivable right
to be represented by a defense attorney," and thus, "[t]here, is no statutory
exception which would permit representation by a [guardian ad litem]even one who is also an attorney at law." 53 With a clear understanding of
the differences between the roles of a guardian and an attorney, the court
explained its conclusion:

[W]hen a guardian ad litem [GAL] is appointed in a delinquency
case, it is generally because there is no interested parent or legal
guardian to represent the child's best interests. In these situations,
the GAL must act in the role of a concerned parent, which is often
in opposition to the position of defense counsel. . . . Further, a

GAL-unlike a defense attorney-owes a duty to the court and to
society. A guardian ad litem need not zealously pursue acquittal if
he does not believe acquittal would be in the best interests of the
minor or society.
When counsel attempts to fulfill the role of GAL as well as
defense counsel, the risk that the minor's constitutional and
statutory right to counsel will be diluted, if not denied altogether, is

48.
Id. at 917.
49.
Id.
50.
As the court explained, "Austin's claim requires us to decide . . . whether 'hybrid
representation' is inconsistent with the statutorily and constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel
Austin M., 975 N.E.2d at 37.
afforded minors in delinquency proceedings.
51.
Id. at 42.
52.
Id. at 39.
53.
Id. at 38.
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. We conclude, therefore, that the interests of justice

are best served by finding a per se conflict when minor's counsel
in a delinquency proceeding simultaneously functions as both
defense counsel and guardian ad litem.54
Thus, the court concluded that the type of representation which due
process requires in delinquency proceedings is that of defense counsel, that
is, that of "an attorney whose singular loyalty is to the defense of the
juvenile.""5 This has been the position of professional organizations and
scholars for a long time,s6 and now it is the official position of the state of
Illinois. Hopefully, other states will take notice and begin moving in the
right direction.
CONCLUSION

In delinquency proceedings, the duties of an attorney for a minor client
are fundamentally different than those of a guardian ad litem. They are so
different, in fact, that attempting to serve as an attorney and a guardian at
the same time has often eliminated the effectiveness of the attorney's role
as an advocate for the minor client, thus making it impossible for the
attorney to provide the type of effective assistance of counsel that is
guaranteed by the Constitution.
For this reason, the roles of attorneys and guardians ad litem should
never be combined or confused. To the extent that this is happening across
the United States, attorneys are attempting to do the impossible. In order to
fulfill one role, they must fail at the other.
Remedying this problem is a critical element in the effort to improve
the quality of juvenile justice. Because juveniles facing delinquency
proceedings have the right to counsel and the right to effective assistance of
counsel, the recommendations and adopted standards of numerous
organizations, scholars, commentators, and conferences are in agreement
that it is imperative to abandon the approach to juvenile justice that allows
54.
Id. at 42.
55.
Austin M., 975 N.E.2d at 40.
56.
For example, this is the view adopted by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, the
ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, and the
Juvenile Delinquency Guidelines of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court. It is also the
conclusion reached by the two most important national conferences on issues related to the
representation of children. See, Bernabe, supra note 3, at 874-75, 877 (discussing the findings of
Fordham University School of Law's Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, held in 1995, and the University of Nevada-Las Vegas Law School's Conference on
Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, held in
2006); see also NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
GUIDELINES, IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 40 (2005), available at

http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/juveniledelinquencyguidelinescompressed[l].pdf.
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the possibility of representation by an attorney who, in reality, acts as a
guardian ad litem.17
The Supreme Court of Illinois has now added its voice to this list. As
the court explained in People v. Austin M, the problem can be avoided
simply by making sure that the appointed guardian ad litem is someone
other than the minor's lawyer, thus allowing the lawyer to fulfill the role of
advocate and preserving and protecting the minor's right to counsel.
Adopting this approach would result in many benefits. First, it would
reduce the danger of lawyers interjecting their personal opinions and values
into the proceedings. Second, it would promote the same type of
performance from all lawyers, regardless of who happens to represent the
minors in any given case. Third, it would place the lawyers in the best
position to perform the role for which lawyers are best trained. Fourth,
children will be assured that the state will comply with its duty to protect
their right to counsel. Fifth, if the child needs a guardian, the child will get
the benefit of one in addition to the benefit of an attorney. Sixth, the best
interests of the child are better served if the child's attorney can work
together with a guardian who is not an attorney and who is trained to serve
as a guardian. 8 Seventh, children will benefit from being able to participate
in their own defense with full confidence that their attorney will not
disclose confidences and will be committed to advocating their preferences.
Finally, by not having the child's attorney act as a guardian, the state will
be forced to do its own investigation in order to prove its case against the
minor beyond a reasonable doubt. The result will be a system that is fairer
and that protects the rights and the interests of minors more efficiently.
The Illinois Supreme Court has cleared the way for the state to begin
building such an improved system. Others should follow its example. With
its decision in People v. Austin, the Illinois Supreme Court has taken a
good step forward in the right direction. As it was in the past, Illinois is
now back at the forefront in the creation of a fair and equitable juvenile
justice system."

57.
For a more detailed discussion of the recommendations of some of these organizations,
commentators, and conferences, see Bernabe, supra note 3.
58.
For a discussion of this topic, see Daniella Levine, To Assert Children's Legal Rights or
Promote Children's Needs: How to Attain Both Goals, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2023 (1996).
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59.
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http://www.state.il.us/defender/acrobatdocs/jreport.pdf ("From the inception of the world's first
juvenile court over 100 years ago [in Chicago] . . . Illinois has historically been a place where new ideas
and strategies that impact children and families have been born, tested and refined .... ).

